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BOOK REVIEWS
Less than the Sum of its Parts
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES by Laurence H. Tribe, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1985. Pp. xiv, 458. $25.00.
Reviewed by Charles F. Abernathy*
In Return of the Secaucus Seven and The Big Chill, film makers in early mid-
dle age examined college society of the late 1960s and early 1970s, wistfully ap-
proving its values and aspirations even as they demonstrated that those values
could not survive intact in the 1980s. These movies about values erroneously
lost and erroneously retained, about the choices made by a generation, are the
best of contemporary nostalgic films.
Contemporary professors of constitutional law have been busy at a similar
task. In the last five years, our best professors have produced a crop of books
that reexamine the legitimacy of judicial review and constitutional lawmaking by
courts.1 These books are also, in a sense, nostalgic works, treatises alluding to
the Warren Court's values and the aspirations it engendered, values and aspira-
tions that were undercut as the Burger Court refused to extend Warren-era pre-
cedent or, worse yet, retained precedent that seemed to cause new problems
rather than alleviate old ones. These books relate distantly to Marbury v.
Madison2 the way modern torts books relate to Anonymous. 3 Though their topic
is the ever-present one of judicial legitimacy, they have been shaped by the heat
of only the last twenty-five years.
Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional Law4 offered the only substantial
alternative, a brilliant one, to such nostalgic books. Because the others were so
clearly shaped by current events, one suspected that even process-oriented au-
thors had manipulated concerns about process in order to promote their own
current social policies. Tribe, on the other hand, gave us a truly long-term view
of constitutional law that saw the field not as a set of rules, but as a collection of
modes of thought, some successful, some less so, but each with a discernible set
of problems and attempted solutions that was influenced by the mode of thought
itself. Tribe gave constitutional law what it had -lacked since Cooleys-struc-
ture. More precisely, he did not give constitutional law a structure so much as
he disclosed its own inherent structure, thereby transcending all prior arguments
about legitimacy, neutral principles, and nostalgia-laden social values.6
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See, eg., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1982).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, f. 7, pl. 18 (1466).
4. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1980).
5. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1880).
6. Tribe has retained this transcendent perspective in the first chapter of Constitutional Choices, declar-
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Constitutional Choices,7 therefore, comes to an audience with high expecta-
tions. And that is, perhaps, why it is ultimately unsatisfying. From the author
who has shown us the structure of constitutional law, a book urging us to believe
that there are constitutional choices to be made is small potatoes. Of course
there are constitutional choices to be made. What we need to know is how better
to make these choices, but Tribe only offers examples of the choices he has made.
If his secondary goal is to continue to persuade us that the legitimacy problem
can still be transcended, he has not succeeded. The reader is likely to be more
skeptical after reading Constitutional Choices than before.
I. A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
Constitutional Choices is not a newly created treatise but a collection of essays
on a diverse range of topics. Most were printed previously in serial publications,
and the others, one suspects, arose from projects undertaken independently of
one another over the last few years. Such reprintings may strike some as a waste
of paper and purchasers' money, but, as The New Yorker Album of Drawings
amply proves, additional insight is often gained from seeing parts brought to-
gether as a whole. But that is not the case here, for the whole of Tribe's new
book is less than the sum of its parts.
Much of the failure of Tribe's book lies in the quality of the parts taken indi-
vidually. The essays are not poor; they are simply like everyone else's essays.
The introductory set starts off strongly enough. It repeats the powerful argu-
ments that there are many more substantive norms in the Constitution than pro-
cess-guaranteeing authors care to admit, and that even process-oriented
solutions often only mask substantive decisions. When John Ely talks about
"we" (whites/men) and "they" (blacks/women) and suspects that the demo-
cratic process has been corrupted when "we" put "them" at a disadvantage, he
has made a disguised substantive decision about what groups are cognizable as
"we" and "they"-or even, indeed, about what is the membership of the "we"
and "they" groups. 8
Yet the first group of essays is convincing only in showing that the "Constitu-
tion tells us something."9 The remaining essays must carry the weight of defin-
ing or exemplifying what that something is, or else there is no vision to the book.
But the author's two groups of essays, one on separation of powers, the other on
individual rights, are unsatisfyingly ordinary and often only reportorial.
A. ESSAYS ON SEPARATION OF POWERS
With so many essays to describe, it is difficult for the reviewer to establish that
his subject has not performed outstandingly. I could note that Tribe's essay on
ing his view that legitimizing theories are not "even worth criticizing in great detail ... not simply
amusing in their pretentious but, in the end, as dangerous as they are unconvincing." L. TRIBE, CONsn-
TUTIONAL CHoicEs 6 (1985); see also id. at 273 n.9 ("[I] mean to go beyond the notion that legitimacy is
the product... of constitutional practice.").
7. Iad
8. Id at 14-17.
9. Id at 26 (emphasis in original). While I would not criticize the author's writing style as graceless, it
depends heavily on italics rather than structure in order to provide emphasis. This soon grows tiresome.
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"court-stripping" legislation, originally offered as congressional testimony in op-
position to a flurry of bills limiting federal court jurisdiction, adds nothing to
expositions already put forward in excellent law review articles which the author
does not acknowledge. 10 Similarly, the essay on standing, which reaches the
wholly unremarkable conclusion that the Court has probably manipulated
standing rules to achieve desired substantive results," is demonstrably secon-
dary in its observations 12 and much less interesting than the Brilmayer-Tushnet
debate of a few years ago. 13
Two essays in particular show why this book fails to meet the reader's expec-
tations. The essay on National League of Cities v. Usery,14 which discusses the
principal case and its offspring, makes some interesting, though not earth-shak-
ing, observations x5 and, therefore, develops for us a fuller understanding of what
the Court has been doing. Professor Tribe cannot be faulted for failing to foresee
the likelihood that the Court would overrule such a recent decision.' 6 What
bothers me is the unsophisticated reason that he gives for having thought Na-
tional League of Cities would endure: "increasing conservatism and widespread
concern for states' rights-and. . . the prospect of more [conservative] appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court."' 7 This is analysis that a first-year law student
could make and ranks up there with such cartoon comments as "the Supreme
Court always reads the election returns."
"Guam's Vanishing Bonds" is the one complete disappointment in this group
10. See, eg., Ratner, Congressional Power over Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 157 (1960); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal
Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1975); see generally Clinton, A
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: .4 Guided Quest for the Original Understanding ofArticle
Hr1, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 742 n.3 (1984) (collecting numerous sources).
11. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 113-14, 347 n.170.
12. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority's standing deci-
sion "can be explained only by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits"). In his discussion of
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), Tribe curiously labels the Court's alternative holding-
denial of equitable relief because of an adequate remedy at law-as dictum. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at
102, 331 n.38. It is at least plausible that the standing rationale was the real dictum. See Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (when both constitutional and nonconstitutional issues arise, consti-
tutional issue preferred ground for decision only when "clearly settled"). Moreover, Tribe fails to discuss
the most far-reaching aspects of the Court's decision to ground its judgment in constitutional law. First, it
deterred the exercise of congressional power to change the result. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting on standing issue) (basing standing decision
on constitutional grounds prevents Congress from rectifying situation). Second, it effectively extended the
equity rule. Equity could often provide a remedy when damages were simply unavailable or inadequate at
law, but by grounding its judgment in constitutional standing rules, the Court forecloses injunctive relief
even when there is no damage remedy at law. Cf Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (official
immunity may prevent recovery of damages in § 1983 actions).
13. See Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle 11P" Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Require-
ment, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1979); Tushnet, The Sociology of Article 1II: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. Rnv. 1698 (1980); Brilmayer, A Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (1980).
14. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005
(1985).
15. Tribe notes, for example, that a congressional requirement that state agencies merely consider a
federal agenda of energy-related issues may intrude on state sovereignty much more than the Court con-
ceded. Such a law not only allocates hearing resources but also may usurp governmental power at the
very basic agenda level where it is decided what topics even merit governmental consideration. L. TRIBE,
supra note 6, at 125-31.
16. Compare L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 137 ("it would be unwise to bury National League of Cities just
yet") with Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct 1005 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities by 5-4 vote).
17. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 137.
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of essays, because it violates Tribe's own rule that the constitutionalist should be
most skeptical when the result seems most obvious.18 In this essay, Tribe dis-
cusses the constitutionality of the Treasury's announcement that it would seek
retroactive repeal of the tax-favored status of proposed bonds. Tribe considers
the case an easy one, because the Executive clearly usurped congressional power
by killing an otherwise lawful bond deal. After discussing the Steel Seizure
Case,19 Tribe hastily concludes that the "power to execute laws does not include
the power to make them."'20 Yet since the President not only executes Congress'
laws, but also has some independent constitutional authority of his own,21 in-
cluding the Article II power to "recommend to [Congress] such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient," 22 I would have thought that something
more than the quoted talismanic phrase should have been discussed. Are execu-
tive veto threats unconstitutional when they successfully scare Congress into in-
action? Is a presidential threat to seek new legislation against abortion-clinic
bombers unconstitutional if it successfully induces such persons to refrain from
acts not currently punishable by federal law?
B. ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Tribe's second group of essays, covering topics related to individual rights,
suffers the same shortcomings as his essays on separation of powers. The most
consistent theme here is that supposedly neutral rules in fact have different im-
pacts on various economic classes because of the groups' varying economic re-
sources. Thus, Tribe notes that the Court's sometimes-articulated speech-
conduct distinction necessarily inhibits those who can only afford to speak by
acting, while it protects those who can afford to pay for a pure-speech printing
press.23 The same can be said of other decisions in the area of individual rights.24
And that is the problem: this can not only be said, it has been said. It was a
problem fifteen years ago when I was a law student, and my students study it
today.25
The economic theme is sounded again in Tribe's essays on property and
affirmative action, and he goes on to develop a corollary notion. This notion is
that the courts' decisions not only discriminate against poor people but also per-
petuate and serve the economic status quo.26 I believe, because I have heard this
18. See id. at 7.
19. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
20. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 161 (emphasis in original).
21. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
22. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 3.
23. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 198-200.
24. See id at 192, 203 (remnants of right-privilege distinction inhibit presumably low-income public
workers from speaking out), 205 (campaign-spending limits stricken while free access to mailboxes de-
nied), 236-37 (discussing discriminatory impact of neutral rules on minorities with fewer economic re-
sources than majorities).
25. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state can impose limit on AFDC aid without
accounting for family size); Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) (Court focuses on specific deprivations resulting from poverty
rather than reducing general inequality). Compare G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1025-27 (1970 ed.) (discussing heightened scrutiny for wealth classifications) with G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 849-53 (1985 ed.) (same book, same topic).
26. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 186, 236-37 (groups with greater economic resources receive greater
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claim before. 27 Indeed, this bias in favor of the status quo seems so fundamental
that it may be one reason for law as we know it.28 These essays are at best only
ordinary incremental scholarship, the extension and popularization of thoughts
originally developed by others.
II. THE WHOLE IS LESS THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
American Constitutional Law proved to be important, in part, because it satis-
fied a widely felt need to turn away from the fetish so many modern constitution-
alists have made of the legitimacy issue. Tribe admits in a candid introduction
that Constitutional Choices is not as global as his initial effort, but he holds out
hope that these essays, with "rough edges only partly trimmed and links only
tentatively forged," will provide us with some clearer "horizons" for constitu-
tional law.29 In essence, he expects that we may detect some looming truth in
these essays so that the "whole will . . . add up to more than the sum of its
several parts." 30 Perhaps some people will see what Tribe thinks is there-Big
Bird can see Snufalofagus and Jimmy Stewart could see Harvey the Rabbit-but
for me no reliable values underlie Professor Tribe's constitutional choices.
"There is," as Gertude Stein once said of Los Angeles, "no there, there."
Occasionally, the essays show no values or are so contradictory that one can
infer no underlying values. The reportorial essay on National League of Cities,
for example, makes it seem that Tribe thinks there is a kernel of truth and desira-
bility in the Court's decision, but he frustratingly takes no position.3 1 The legis-
lative-veto and Guam-bond essays seem at least initially irreconcilable. Tribe
sees the legislative veto as a useful and creative device that responds to the exi-
gencies of modern life and that the Court has arbitrarily stricken in the name of
separation of powers.32 But he sees Treasury's creative announcement of pro-
posed legislation, designed to deter bond sales and thus reduce the perennially
deficit-ridden budget, as a usurpation of power.33 Perhaps there are unarticu-
lated values that help Tribe distinguish these situations. Legislative sovereignty
is a lesser threat to liberty than is executive sovereignty? Positive usurping ac-
tion (the Treasury announcement) is a greater threat to liberty than is negative
usurping action (the legislative veto)?
My greater disappointment, however, arises from the essays that do suggest
values. These essays reveal no underlying ethical system or method for deriving
such values. 34 Instead, the impact of the whole work is simply that Tribe has
protection). Actually, Tribe compliments the Court because, by approving some forms of affirmative ac-
tion, it has not frozen in the status quo. Id at 236.
27. See generally M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (discussing law's protection of status quo).
28. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 556-58 (1983) (discussing constituent elements of West-
ern law).
29. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at x.
30. Id. at ix.
31. See id. at 136-37.
32. See id. at 67-76 (Court failed to justify rejection of legislative veto, which was useful means of
delegating power to Executive while retaining popular control).
33. See iL at 154-61 (Treasury's calculated announcement had legislative effect of making bonds un-
marketable, and power to execute law does not include power to make law).
34. In fact, though he thinks that readers may detect some unifying themes and values in these essays,
Tribe disclaims any interest in normative criteria. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 4.
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values and that they are as idiosyncratic and as biased as any other human be-
ing's set of values. Courts, not just legislatures, he says, should help poor people
through favorable interpretation of the Constitution;35 the same help should be
given to unions, 36 public employees, 37 women,38 and blacks.39 The values are
based on sometimes eccentric, or at least one-sided, views of history: in Tribe's
eyes, the decline of the entire labor movement is directly traceable to the
Supreme Court's refusal to give unions and corporations equal speech rights.4°
And sometimes the motivations for his decisions are as petty as yours and mine.
His veiled criticism of the Skokie decision 4l- since the courts seldom have en-
forced free speech rights evenhandedly, there is no reason to start with the Na-
zis4 2 -is as atrocious as my bad parenting-"that A in history, son, proves that
you could have made better than a B in English."
One can hardly blame Tribe for being human, except that American Constitu-
tional Law held out hope for so much more. That work gave order to the chaos
of constitutional law and held out the vision that this order might itself give us
hints of enduring, or at least workable, values. Constitutional Choices obliterates
that vision. And worse, in the process of showing us that Tribe's values are not
more exalted than anyone else's, this book raises again the issue that Tribe had
hoped to transcend-the legitimacy issue.
The publication of Constitutional Choices should lead us not only to a reevalu-
ation of Professor Tribe's contribution to constitutional law but also to a reap-
praisal of much of current constitutional scholarship and constitutional law
itself. Tribe's genius now appears more clearly than ever to be in his mastery of
macrolaw, the history of legal ideas and how they relate to one another. The
best parts of his current book continue that effort.43 But Constitutional Choices
mainly focuses on the ordinary. These essays on such narrow issues show that
Professor Tribe is a skilled and insightful observer of relevant considerations, but
35. Id. at 187.
36. See id. at 202-03.
37. See id at 203-04, 209.
38. See id at 241.
39. See id at 233-34, 236-37.
40. Tribe writes:
Indeed, the proof of this imbalance of power [regarding the right to speak] can be seen in the
results: 'the failure of labor to pass any [significant legislation] since 1935', and the decline in the
rate of union representation of American workers from 35 percent in the 1940's to barely 20
percent in 1980.
Id. at 202. This is a preposterous statement on several grounds, not the least of which is that employers'
commercial-speech rights were wholly excluded from constitutional protection during most of this period,
as Tribe himself recognizes. See id. at 210-11 (Court did not grant protection to commercial speech until
1976). Although the lack of controls would make an impartial study impossible, I would be extremely
surprised if the decline of the labor movement could be attributed more to indirect judicial rules than to
powerful social and economic forces. Finally, Tribe's statement sounds disturbingly similar to many given
by persons who would override all public and private choices: "the people would have chosen differently
had they known all the facts I was not allowed to show them."
41. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
42. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 219-20 ("In the face of such inconsistent application of the First
Amendment's guarantees, making a virtue of consistently applying an assertedly neutral principle in Sko-
kie. . . may be cause for little assurance or self-congratulation.").
43. The essay on property rights and the contract clause shows flashes of the brilliance of American
Constitutional Law. See L. TRINE, supra note 6, at 165-66, 179-87.
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on this microlaw level he has little more to offer than do many other current
scholars.
What remains for Tribe and others is to resupply the missing or transcendent
element between the doing of constitutional law and the legitimacy of constitu-
tional law.44 Tribe seems sure that the old verities are unworkable, but his insis-
tence that it is worth continuing to do constitutional law because we are doing it
now45 sounds like a familiar law of physics, not social intercourse. I share with
Professor Tribe a reluctance to submit to the notion that constitutional law is
ordinary politics46 or that "power comes out of the barrel of a gun" 47 held by a
federal judge. But these are powerful contending views of law, and it will take
more than Constitutional Choices to deflect them.
44. Some of my colleagues have turned their attention to this topic. See generally L.M. Seidman, G.
Stone, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law (1985) (manuscript in preparation for publication);
Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEO. L.J. 1041 (1985); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional The-
ory, 83 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1502 (1985) (forthcoming).
45. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 4 (author concerned with illuminating choices involved in doing
constitutional law, not making constitutional law seem worth doing).
46. "We must make choices but we must renounce the equally illusory freedom to choose however we
might wish to choose." Id. at 268.
47. II SELECTED WoRKs OF MAO TsE-TUNG 224 (1978).
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